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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred in Ruling that Ms. Myers Could Not Have Acquired
Ownership of the Disputed Tract Through Adverse Possession.
Ms. Fries argues that Ms. Myers could not have acquired the Disputed Tract

through adverse possession, based on the ancient doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi,
or 'time does not run against the king." See Devins v. Borough ofBogota, 592 A.2d 199,
201-02 (NJ. 1991) (explaining basis and history of doctrine ofnullum tempus). What
Ms. Fries fails to note, however, is that a hard-and-fast rule of nullum tempus is not and
has never been the law of the State of Utah. In fact, under Utah law, publicly owned
property that is not held for public use is subject to adverse possession. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-13; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 (seven-year statute of limitations
applies to actions brought by the state respecting title to and possession of real property);
Pioneer Investment & Trust Co. v. Board ofEducation of Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 1, 99 P.
150, 152-53 (1909) (Utah law permits application of adverse possession against stateowned property except as specifically limited by statute). Thus, the real question in this
case is not whether publicly owned property not held for public use is subject to adverse
possession, it is whether any exceptions to the general rule apply to the facts of this case.
Moreover, Ms. Fries' attempt to rely on the doctrine of nullum tempus is flawed in
light of the disfavored status of the doctrine in modern courts. See Rutgers, State
University ofNew Jersey v. Grad Partnership, 634 A.2d 1053, 1054 (NJ. Super.Ct.
1993) (discussing "the ancient, and now almost dead, doctrine of 'nullum tempus occurrit
regC"); Devins, 592 A.2d at 203 ("[F]or municipally-owned real estate not dedicated to

1

or used for a public purpose, nullum tempus is an anachronism.") (emphasis added).
When property owned by a municipality is not in public use, courts have generally
permitted its acquisition through adverse possession. See Siejack v. City ofBaltimore,
313 A.2d 843, 846 (Md. 1974) (noting the "well established . . . notion that municipal
property not devoted to a public use can be" acquired by adverse possession); Goldman v.
Quadrato, 114 A.2d 687, 690 (Conn. 1955) ("Adverse possession will run against a
municipality, however, as to land which is not held for a public use.").1
Here, there is no question that the Disputed Tract has not been in public use for a
minimum of fifty years. Moreover, it is unclear whether the Disputed Tract ever entered
into public use in the first place. More importantly, the Dedication, by its plain language,
created a condition subsequent requiring that the alley be put into perpetual public use.
Utah courts have recognized that "the failure of the grantee of a deed to comply with a
condition subsequent... within a reasonable time" is "sufficient to forfeit the estate."
Salt Lake City v. State, 101 Utah 543, 125 P.2d 790, 792 (1942). Thus, if Salt Lake
County failed to put the former alley into public use within a reasonable time, it forfeited
its ownership of the alley.

Moreover, nullum tempus is based on antiquated assumptions that are even less
applicable today than they were when Utah case law adopted its general rule that
municipal property not held for public use is subject to adverse possession. With the
level of resources available to modern local government bodies, it is not unreasonable to
expect that such bodies maintain responsibility for the property they hold in the same
manner as a private landowner.
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Also, Ms. Fries' reliance on Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 756 P.2d 1268 (Utah
1982), and Ecanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595 (Utah 1974), is misplaced. Neither of those
cases dealt with the specific question of whether an alleyway originally dedicated but
never placed into public use could be abandoned without official action. Utah courts
have recognized the possibility of abandonment by a municipality of property dedicated
for public use without official action when that property ceases to serve such a public use.
White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 124,239 P.2d 210, 213 (1952) ("If the street should
cease to serve my public interest, it may be abandoned...."). Therefore, because the
property dedicated as an alley was either abandoned or because the County's interest was
defeated by its failure to put the alley into public use, Ms. Meyers properly acquired title
to the property through adverse possession. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13.
II.

The District Court Erred in Ruling that Ms. Fries Is the Sole Owner of the
Disputed Tract Because Ms. Myers Is Entitled to, at a Minimum, Half of the
Disputed Tract.
Even if the alley was not vacated until the County's enactment of the Ordinance,

the district court erred in holding that Ms. Fries became the sole owner of the entire
Disputed Tract. There is no Utah case law holding that only property owners within a
platted subdivision are entitled to ownership of a vacated public way that was platted
within that subdivision. Also, no Utah court has held that the vacating of a public way
dedicated from a certain subdivision results in reversion solely to owners located within
that subdivision.
Ms. Fries relies on State v. Mobile River Telephone Company, 898 So. 2d 763
(Ala. Ct. App. 2004), to support her view that upon vacation of the alley, the entire
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Disputed Tract would "revert" to her ownership. Her reliance on that case is misplaced,
however, because it is based on a fundamentally different view of dedication. Under
Utah law, upon dedication of a public road, the public obtains fee ownership, rather than
a mere easement, in the dedicated property. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-607(l) (formerly §
10-9-807) (emphasis added). In some other states, including Alabama, dedication results
only in an easement held by the public. See Mobile River Terminal Co., Inc., 898 So. 2d
at 774; Terwelp v. Sass, 443 N.E.2d 804, 806 (111. Ct. App. 1982) ("[U]nder a common
law plat the fee of the tract purported to be conveyed remains in the dedicator, burdened
only with an easement over the way in question and subject to the acceptance of the
easement by the public"). Thus, under the common law in several states, the original
dedicator maintains an interest in the subject property, which is burdened only by an
easement held by the public.
However, Utah views dedication differently than does Alabama or the common
law cited above. Under Utah law, upon dedication, the alley was owned by the public in
fee until it was abandoned or otherwise vacated. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-607(l) Thus,
the original dedicator (and his successors in interest) held no greater claim to the property
than did Ms. Myers and her predecessors. Under the plain language of the Ordinance:
All right, title and interest in and to the portion of said alley being
vacated is to revert by operation of law to the abutting property
owner or owners.
(Ordinance, R. at 15; emphasis added.) Because it is undisputed that Ms. Meyers is an
"abutting property owner," Ms. Meyers was entitled, at the very least, to half of the
disputed tract. As such, and in the alternative, the order of summary judgment should be
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reversed and the case remanded with instructions to the district court to enter an order
dividing the Disputed Tract equally between Ms. Meyers and Ms. Fries.
III.

The District Court Erred in Ruling that There Were No Disputed Issues of
Material Fact.
The district court erred in ruling that there were no disputed issues of fact and that

summary judgment was therefore appropriate. No discovery has taken place in this case,
and Ms. Myers has had no opportunity to explore the history of the Disputed Tract or
otherwise establish her right to ownership. The district court ruled that there were no
disputed issues of fact based on its conclusion that the only means by which the former
alley "could cease to be the property of the county is by formal vacation by the county,"
which the court ruled did not take place until the Ordinance was passed. (R. at 282.)
Substantial questions remain, however, about whether the alley ever entered into public
use in the first place. If the alley was never put into public use, it could never have been
owned, let alone abandoned, by the County, and Ms. Myers would be entitled to
ownership. Thus, in light of the disputed issues of fact, the district court's order should
be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Myers respectfully requests that the Court reverse
the order granting Ms. Fries' Motion for Summary Judgment and remand this case for
further proceedings.
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